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NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-ENFORCING
TAx CLAIM IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION.-It has been decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States that a valid tax judgment ren-
dered against a taxpayer in one state is entitled to full faith and credit
in other states.1 Comment on that decision has been favorable 2 But,
feeling that the decision has not gone far enough, the same critics have
proposed this question: Can one state recover in the courts of another
state upon a tax claim not reduced to judgment?
If the full faith and credit clause3 extends to a tax judgment, does
it likewise cover a mere statutory tax assessment, assuming that such
assessment is made by due process of law? The constitution provides
that "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state." It has been
held that the phrase "public acts" includes at least the statutes of the
several states.4 Perhaps upon reading the provision one might conclude
that it means what it says and that it applies wherever one of the par-
ties to the controversy sets up a foreign statute either to prove his
case or his defense. But just as limitations of construction have been
placed on the full faith and credit clause in relation to foreign judg-
ments, so must limitations be made to apply to foreign statutes. To do
otherwise would make a foreign statute more powerful than the law
of the forum. Nevertheless, no definite line of demarcation has been
drawn, although there are cases which throw light on the problem.
Presumably the most important consideration is what is to be done
where the public policy of the forum conflicts with the policy of for-
eign statutes.
In Converse v. Hamilton' a Minnesota receiver of a Minnesota
corporation sued in Wisconsin to enforce an assessment of stockhold-
ers authorized by the Minnesota statutes and levied by an order of a
Minnesota court in a suit to which the Wisconsin defendants were not
parties. The Wisconsin court dismissed the case on the ground that to
allow the action to be maintained would be contrary to the settled pub-
lic policy of the state. The Supreme Court reversed the decision on the
ground that not only was full faith and credit refused to a Minnesota
judgment, but also because it was refused to a Minnesota statute. Since
the Wisconsin defendants were in no way involved in the Minnesota
action or decree, the basis of the Supreme Court's decision must have
been founded on the obligation created by the Minnesota statute. In
' Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229, 80 L.ed'
220 (1935).
2 Hazelwood, The Full Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to Enforcement of
Tax Judgments (1934) 19 MARQ. L. Rav. 10; Note (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 121.
Mr. Hazelwood was one of the attorneys for Milwaukee County in the White
case.
U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
4 Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154, 155, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L.ed.
1026, 1032 (1931) ; Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551,
45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L.ed. 783, 785 (1924) ; Tennessee Coal Iron & Ry. Co. v.
George, 233 U.S. 354, 360, 34 Sup. Ct. 587, 58 L.ed. 997, 1000 (1913) ; Chicago
& Alton Ry. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 620, 621, 75 Sup. Ct. 398,
30 L.ed. 519, 522 (1887).
'244 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L.ed. 749 (1912).
NOTE
this case Wisconsin policy was not a valid reason for dismissing the
action.
In Bradford Electric Co. v. Clappet4 Mrs. Clapper brought an
action for the unlawful death of her husband against his employer.
The accident occured in New Hampshire, but the contract of employ-
ment was made under the laws of Vermont where both parties resided.
The judgment of the New Hampshire court was for the plaintiff under
New Hampshire law. The defendant contending that the law of the
place of the contract should be applied appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. In the opinion reversing the decision of the New
Hampshire court, the Supreme Court said that the "power of Vermont
to effect legal consequences by legislation is not limited strictly to
occurrences within its borders." The court continued to say that a
plaintiff suing in one state on a cause of action based on a statute of
another state might be denied relief because the enforcement of the
right conferred would be obnoxious to the public policy of the forum,
that is, prejudicial to the interests of its citizens, but that in this case
the interests of the citizens of New Hampshire did not enter. The
court refused to give an opinion concerning what would happen if one
of the parties had been a citizen of New Hampshire.
In another casey the court affirmed the decision of the California
court to apply its own law. There the facts were the same as those in
the Clapper case except that the action was brought where the contract
of employment was made rather than where the accident happened.
After holding that there was sufficient public interest to allow the court
to apply its own law,8 the Supreme Court in an opinion written by
Justice Stone laid down a norm by which the full faith and credit
clause is to be applied. Where two statutes conflict-the statute of
the forum and the foreign statute--"the conflict is to be resolved not
by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling
the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of
the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each juris-
diction, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight."
Justice Stone argued in his opinion that this was not a reversal of the
Clapper case, but rather that they were both decided on the same
principle, that is, that in the formal case the governmental interest of
the foreign state overweighed the interest of the state of the forum.
How then, do these decisions effect our specific problem? It is
reasonable to assume that if the norm above stated shall be applied
to a case where there is no statute in the forum to conflict with the
foreign statute and where the court in which the action is brought
has only the duty to protect the rights of that one citizen who is the
defendant in the action, then the action shall come within the full faith
and credit clause and the foreign state shall be able to recover, through
the aid of the forum, a tax assessment levied by it under the authority
6 286 U.S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L.ed. 1026 (1931).
7 Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 294
U.S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L.ed. 1043 (1935).
8 The plaintiffs were citizens of California and it was argued that if they were
unable to recover in California they would be precluded from recovery since
it was financially impossible to go to Alaska to bring action. As a result they
would become public charges in California. The court thought this to be a
very real public interest.
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of its own statute. Surely the governmental interest of the plaintiff
state is greater than the paternally protective interest of the state of
the forum.
But the comment of Judge Learned Hand is still to be considered.0
The case is almost directly in point with the problem being considered
here. It was appealed to the Supreme Court but was affirmed on
another ground entirely. The court expressly refused to discuss the
problem here. In the circuit court of appeals it was stated that taxes
are imposts collected for the support of the government by virtue of
its sovereign power, that no contractual or quasi-contractual obligation
to pay arises and therefore a tax can in no way be termed a debt. The
Supreme Courf expressly repudiates this contention when it says:-
" • ..still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a statutory
liability, quasi-contractual in nature, enforceable, if there is no con-
clusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common law action
of debt or indebitatus assumpsit." If the obligation is one of a kind
that could have been brought at common law within one of the nine
common law actions, then there should be no necessity under our
codified forms of pleading and practice to first obtain a judgment in
a local court before attempting to recover in a foreign court. It is as
much a debt before the judgment as after and as such should be recog-
nized in the foreign courts.
Judge Hand also argued that it is "repugnant to the principles of
private international law" for one state to act as a collector of taxes
for another state. As one writer said,:" such a consideration does have
great weight as between independent nations, but as between states of
our union it is much less potent. If a court by the authority of the
White case must give effect to a foreign judgment based on a tax
claim, it certainly should give effect to the claim itself since it is then
in its power to test the validity of such claim. As the court said :---"In
the circumstances here disclosed no state can be said to have a legiti-
mate policy against payment of its neighbors' taxes, the obligation of
which has been judicially established by courts to whose judgments in
practically every other instance it must give full faith and credit."
How much less reason would there be for such policy if the court can
scrutinize the obligation and determine its validity for itself. "Th.
essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not
changed by recovering judgment upon it... 3.
SAMUEL H. SHERMAN.
Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929).
-O Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229, 80 L.ed.
220 (1935).
"Note (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 121.
12Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32
L.ed. 239, 244 (1888).
